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ABSTRACT 
Over the last two decades, many governments around the world have implemented programmes to 
mobilize venture capital (VC) in support of new and innovative firms. In this paper, we analyze 
whether and how the impact of publicly-supported VC funds varies between high-tech and low-tech 
regions, when compared to private VC funds. Our analyses on a sample of 898 VC-backed 
companies in the United Kingdom in the period 1998-2007 show for public VC funds: (a) a greater 
propensity to invest in early-stage and technology-based sectors, which is especially pronounced in 
low-tech regions; (b) a greater propensity toward staging and a greater ability to attract partners in 
syndication, especially in high-tech regions; (c) lower exit rates of investee companies, in terms of 
IPO/acquisition, as compared to private VC funds. Overall, our findings confirm that regional 
characteristics do matter if we want to more rigorously assess the effectiveness of public VC 
programmes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last two decades, many governments and regional authorities in Europe and other 
countries in the world have implemented programmes to  mobilize venture capital in support of 
newly established, innovative firms, with the objectives to remedy funding gaps in private capital 
markets, leverage private sector financing and fostering the creation and growth of technology-
based companies. Stimulated by the implementation of such initiatives, in recent years several 
works in the field of entrepreneurial finance have tried to assess the effectiveness of different public 
policy instruments for the creation of active venture capital markets (Cumming, 2007; Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2006; Lerner, 2002b). Such literature has contributed to identify successful 
experiences, critical aspects to design effective public venturing initiatives and potential distortions 
deriving from the public involvement in the VC market.  
However, only a limited number of empirical studies have tried to take into consideration the 
regional dimension in the assessment of the effectiveness of public VC programmes (Lerner, 1995; 
Murray, 1998). The necessity to assess in more depth the influence of regional characteristics 
derives from the existence of “regional equity gaps”, as a consequence of the uneven geographical 
distribution of skills, investments, innovation and entrepreneurial  opportunities (Mason and 
Harrison, 2003; Sunley et al., 2005). The significant concentration of venture capital funds and 
attractive investment opportunities in certain regions, make the promotion of public venture capital 
funds in economically lagging regions a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, such areas have 
more unmet needs for VC investments, on the other hand they present higher risks that public 
program will fund firms with inferior business prospects. In order to address such critical issues, 
Gompers and Lerner (2001) suggest that public venture programs should aim at different objectives 
in regions and countries characterized by different stages of development of both the economic 
sector and the VC industry. Nevertheless, as argued by Sunley et al. (2005), “[…] at present very 
little is known about the character, operation and outcomes of regional venture capital policies”. 
Starting from such premises, this paper aims to fill this gap, by analyzing whether and how the 
impact of publicly-supported venturing programs varies between high-tech and low-tech regions. 
Following the approach of Cumming (2008), we investigate the performance of hybrid VC funds 
(i.e. funds backed by both private and public sector funding) as opposed to private VC funds in the 
different regions of the United Kingdom along three interrelated dimensions: 1) the propensity of 
hybrid VC funds to invest in early-stage and high-technology sectors, in order to complement 
investment strategies of private VC funds; 2) the capacity of public VC funds to attract qualified 
private VC investors in the regions, through staging and syndication investment policies; 3) the 
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ability of public VC funds to invest in and promote successful companies, by analyzing their exit 
rates (in terms of IPO, mergers or acquisitions, write-offs). In all the cases, we try to assess whether 
such differences are more or less pronounced in low-tech regions as opposed to high-tech regions. 
We provide empirical evidence from a sample of 898 companies backed by hybrid and private VC-
funds in the United Kingdom over the period 1998-2007. We decided to focus on the experience of 
the United Kingdom since its VC industry is relatively more developed than in other European 
countries and it has implemented several important direct policy measures to support VC 
investments over the last decade, starting from the “ Competitiveness White Paper” published  in 
1998 (Nightingale et al. 2009). Our univariate and regression analyses confirm that regional 
characteristics do matter if we want to more rigorously assess the effectiveness of public VC 
programmes, given that important differences emerge between high-tech and low-tech regions. 
Our results show that hybrid VC funds have: (a) a greater propensity to invest in early-stage and 
technology-based sectors, which is especially pronounced in low-tech regions; (b) a greater 
propensity toward staging and a greater ability to attract partners in syndication, especially in high-
tech regions; c) lower exit rates of investee companies in terms of IPO/acquisition as compared to 
private VC funds, and significantly lower write-off rates in low-tech regions.  
Overall, our findings provide a mixed picture as to the contribution of hybrid VC funds in closing 
the regional equity gaps. On the one hand, they highlight a positive orientation towards investing in 
types of companies and sectors that tend to be neglected by private VC funds, an effort which is 
particularly evident in low-tech regions. On the other hand, they show that profound differences 
remain between hybrid and private VC funds, along several performance measures, and that the gap 
is often more pronounced in low-tech regions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical background 
related to government interventions in support of VC investments by highlighting and discussing 
the presence of regional equity gaps. In section 3, we present a brief overview of the government-
supported VC funds in the United Kingdom, we describe the sample and data sources and we define 
our variables. In section 4, we show the results from the univariate statistics and logit and Poisson 
regressions. The last section discusses the main findings and policy implications. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
In this section, we first briefly provide a rationale for the government intervention in support of VC 
investments and discuss then the importance of considering in more depth the existence of regional 
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disparities in the supply/demand of risk capital to new technology based firms. We then illustrate 
how the regional dimension can be incorporated in the assessment of the different policy initiatives.  
 
2.1. Government policies for VC investments and regional equity gaps  
 
The rationale for the government intervention to improve the access of small firms to equity 
financing is usually rooted in the financing gap argument, that is the limited availability of private 
venture capital investments in high-tech, early stage companies (Lerner, 2002b; Lockett et al., 2002; 
Wright and Robbie, 1998). The economic literature suggests that the motives for public intervention 
in favoring SMEs‟ ability to encounter barriers to access to private financing means are twofold 
(Lerner, 1999): 1) the spillover hypothesis, suggesting that SMEs are able to generate positive 
externalities, by creating new jobs, new ideas, and new abilities that other industries and the 
economy as a whole may enjoy (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997, Lerner, 1999, Cressy, 2002, OECD, 
2004, European Commission, 2005); 2) the existence of market failures, such as the presence of 
asymmetric information in terms of adverse selection and moral hazard (Hyytinen and Väänänen, 
2006). Thus, the availability of risk capital for small and highly innovative companies, newly-
established enterprises, and firms located in depressed areas has been a key policy issue for 
governments in different countries of the world  in order to promote not only the growth of these 
companies, but also of the whole economic development. 
Governmental bodies around the world are paying increasing attention to the finance of such 
innovative firms through different types of indirect and direct measures (Poterba, 1989, Lerner, 
1999, Gompers and Lerner, 2001, Gilson, 2002). Indirect measures aim at creating proper 
economic, institutional and regulatory frameworks within which markets can effectively channel 
resources to new and innovative enterprises (OECD, 1997). For instance, governments can facilitate 
the development of stock markets, determine a favorable fiscal treatment for equity investments, 
support entrepreneurship, favor networking among entrepreneurs and investors. In this paper we 
explicitly focus on a second set of direct measures, related to publicly-funded schemes which aim to 
increase the supply of venture capital financing. Such schemes can be either directed to small and 
medium enterprise, as in the cases of public funds directly invested in individual portfolios of 
SMEs, or indirectly channeled to venture capital firms. In this latter case, indirect support occurs 
since the government (or other regional or local public authorities) invests as a limited partner in 
one or more professional venture capital funds (Poterba, 1989, Gilson, 2002, Kanniainen and 
Keuschnigg, 2004, Avnimelech and Teubal, 2006, Cumming, 2007). The involvement of 
commercially motivated, private sector investors acting as „agents‟ on behalf of government 
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„principals‟ in managing so-called “hybrid funds” has now become the predominant modus 
operandi in several countries of the world (Jaaskelainen et al., 2007). 
It is noteworthy that several public venture programmes established over the last decade in a wide 
variety of countries - including Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom - have had an important regional dimension, either because they were promoted and/or 
managed by regional authorities, or because they operated on a regional basis
1
. According to Sunley 
et al. (2005) there are three main motivations in support of regionally-oriented venture capital 
programmes. The first one states that they can better respond to specific regional conditions and 
problems, thanks to the establishment of closer relations and direct interactions between investors, 
entrepreneurs and supporting institutions. Indeed, there is ample evidence in the literature that local 
proximity between the venture capital firms and the investee companies is an important condition 
for the success of early-stage investments (Cumming and Dai, 2009). Second, regional venture 
capital programmes could be better coordinated with other locally-oriented innovation policies 
aimed at fostering the creation and development of high quality, high potential firms worthy of 
investment. Third, venture capital programs with a regional dimension might better address regional 
equity gaps and market failures, origintating in specific regions. Indeed, previous research has 
emphasized that there are significant differences in R&D and innovation intensity across regions, 
that are associated with differences in innovation performance and economic growth (Mason and 
Harrison, 2003). In a similar vein, private venture capital investments tend to be strongly 
concentrated in a limited number of economically advanced regions, characterized by the presence 
of promising entrepreneurial opportunities (Cumming and Dai, 2009; Powell et al., 2001; Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001). At the same time, previous studies have emphasized the distortions and problems 
which can derive by an excessive regionalization of public venture capital programs such as (a) the 
lack of valuable entrepreneurial opportunities with high growth potential, (b) the propensity to 
support politically connected firms with few growth prospects and (c) the lack of experience and 
skills of local VC investors (Lerner, 1999; Mason and Harrison, 2003). 
Overall, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of publicly-supported VC programs, which takes 
into account regional characteristics, is largely missing. A notable exception is represented by the 
study of Lerner (1999) on the long-run impact of the Small Business Innovation Research Program 
                                                 
1
 For instance, nine Regional Venture Capital Funds (RVCFs) were launched starting from 2002 in the United 
Kingdom, representing a £250 million investment programme supported by the private sector along with £74 million of 
Government investment. In Germany, most states have established in the 1990s new venture capital firms with a public 
majority share (in most cases held by the relevant Landesbank and/or regional development agencies) (Sunley et al., 
2005).  In different regions of Italy, such as Toscana, Lombardia, Piemonte and Emilia-Romagna, several hybrid funds 
have been established over the last decade, pooling financial resources from the regional authorities and from private 
investors. 
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in the United States, showing that the superior performance of SBIR awardees (in terms of 
employment and growth rates) as compared to matched companies was confined to firms in regions 
with substantial venture capital activity. However, systematic evidence from other countries and 
other types of public programmes is largely missing. Moreover, in order to fully capture differences 
across regions in the effectiveness of public venture programs, it is necessary to take into 
consideration a wide set of performance dimensions, as we will discuss in the next section. 
 
2.2. How to assess the impact of public venture capital programmes at the regional level? 
 
Different approaches have been used in the economic and finance literature in order to assess the 
impact of government support to venture capital. A first approach adopts a macro-level of analysis, 
focusing on the relationship between public and private sources of venture capital at the regional or 
country level, in order to assess the existence of complementarity vs. substitution between the two 
forms. At the region level, for instance, the study by Cumming and Macintosh (2006) analyzes the 
effects of a Canadian tax-driven venture capital vehicle (LSVCC) on the supply of private venture 
capital funds in different Candian geographic regions. At the country level, the work of Leleux and 
Surlemont (2003) investigates the effects of publicly sponsored or managed venture capital funds in 
the development of national venture capital markets in 15 European countries.  
A second approach focuses on the level of the VC fund, trying to assess the financial performance 
of publicly supported VC funds relative to private VC funds (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003; 
Brander et al., 2002). For instance, the study of Murray (1998) on the European Seed Capital Fund 
Scheme highlights that the target Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the managers of the publicly-
supported VC funds were significantly lower than the target IRR for commercial VC funds‟ 
managers. 
A third approach looks at the characteristics and economic performance of the companies funded by 
publicly-supported VC funds vis a vis a comparable sample of other companies, as in the paper of 
Lerner (1999) previously mentioned. In a recent report on venture-capital schemes backed by both 
private and public sector (so-called hybrid VC funds) in the United Kingdom, Nightinghale et al. 
(2009) compare the performance of 782 companies funded by hybrid VC funds against similarly 
matched companies, in terms of general capacity building, profitability and labour productivity. 
Their econometric analyses show that such schemes have had a positive effect on firm performance, 
encouraging the involvement in growth-oriented investment behavior. Cumming (2007) studies the 
performance of companies funded under the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) governamental 
program in Australia relative to those backed by other types of private equity and venture capital 
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funds, presenting positive evidence on the fact that the IIF has fostered the development of the VC 
industry in Australia. 
We decided to adopt this latter approach in our regional-level analysis of the impact of government 
supported VC funds. More precisely, we focus on the characteristics and performance of companies 
backed by publicly supported VC funds (so-called hybrid VC funds) as compared to private VC 
funds, trying to assess whether differences emerge between high-tech and low-tech regions. As in 
the study of Cumming (2007), we perform the comparison along three different dimensions that are 
particularly coherent with the objectives of public venture programmes: a) the propensity to invest 
in early-stage, high-tech ventures, in order to fill the equity gap; b) the ability to attract additional 
venture capital in the region, through staging and syndication policy; c) the exit outcome for 
portfolio companies. 
Concerning the first dimension, there is wide evidence that private venture capitalists tend to have a 
bias against investing in very early stage companies, due to the high levels of risks and the presence 
of significant information asymmetries (Murray and Lott, 1995; Lockett et al., 2002). Moreover, 
they tend to concentrate on a few industries (typically ICT and healthcare), which present the 
highest growth potential, and tend to neglect opportunities in other areas. Therefore, a first critical 
objective for public VC programs should be that to promote investments in stages and technologies 
which are not popular among private venture investors. As to this point, Gompers and Lerner 
(2001) argue that the focus of public intervention should differ between more developed countries 
or regions and less developed ones. In the former case, in regions where an active venture capital 
sector is already present, the main focus of public venture programs should be that to complement 
the private sector. This means that we should observe hybrid funds strongly concentrated in 
seed/start-up companies (with the private sector typically concentrated in early-stage/expansion 
phases) and more diversified in terms of industry (with the private sector typically concentrated in 
sectors with high growth potential, such as healthcare and ICT). On the other hand, in economically 
lagging regions, a primary objective of government intervention should be that of creating a 
venture-investing infrastructure, supporting start-ups in novel and more technologically-advanced 
sectors. Our empirical analyses will therefore first compare the propensity of publicly supported VC 
funds to invest in seed/start-up firms and in high-technology sectors relative to their private 
counterparts, in order to assess differences between high-technology and low-technology regions. 
As concerns the second dimension of interest – the ability to attract private venture capital in the 
regions – a major objective of public venture schemes should be that to act as a catalyst in order to 
encourage the involvement of major VC funds in the region. Such priority is particularly relevant 
for less developed regions, given that the localization of venture capital firms tends to be spatially 
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concentrated in high-tech and financial hotspots, such as the Silicon Valley or the Boston Area in 
the United States, or London and the South East in the United Kingdom
2
. Moreover, an effective 
government program should aim not only to attract private venture capitalists‟ financial resources in 
the region, but also qualified investment expertise and extensive contact networks. A very 
successful government effort to this purpose is represented by the Yozma Venture Capital Fund 
established by the Israeli government in 1992, with the goals to encourage the involvement of major 
international corporations in the Israeli technology sector and to stimulate the development of a 
professionally managed, private VC industry in the country, by bringing in foreign venture 
capitalists‟ investment expertise (Avnimelech and Teubal, 2006). 
We will therefore compare the staging frequency and the propensity to syndicate of publicly 
supported VC funds relative to their private counterparts in both high-tech and low-tech regions. As 
an additional contribution to previous literature, we will not just focus on the number of different 
funds involved in syndication networks, but also on their relative quality and ability to provide a 
significant contribution for the local economic and innovative growth. To this end, we will consider 
also the propensity to syndicate with foreign (i.e. non-UK based) VC firms and with corporate 
venture capital firms. 
Finally, the third dimension of impact that we consider focuses on exit performance as an objective 
way to assess the entrepreneurial company performance and the success of its venture capital 
investors. Previous literature has widely referred to the achievement of a positive exit for the 
investee company through IPO or trade sale, both at the fund level (i.e. Hochberg et al., 2005) and 
at the company level (i.e., Cumming, 2007; Gompers et al., 2005). The rationale refers to the fact 
that VC firms are able to earn a capital gain from their investments only in the case of an exit 
through IPO or a sale to another company. We could expect to observe significant differences in the 
exit rates of companies backed by public VC funds between high-tech and low-tech regions, for at 
least three different reasons. First, managers of public VC funds in less economically developed 
regions might subordinate the achievement of relevant financial objectives to wider developmental 
goals (Murray, 1998)
3
. Second, they might be unable to find sufficient investment opportunities, in 
terms of number of firms with high enough potential growth rates. This could results in distortions 
such as investments in underachieving companies or in more politically-connected ones (Lerner, 
                                                 
2
 For instance, Powell et al (2002) found a strong pattern of spatial concentration of new enterprises and venture capital 
firms in the biotech sector in the United States, with considerable number of both to be found in in the Bay Area and in 
Boston. Mason and Harrison (2003) highlight the uneven distribution of VC investment activity in UK regions, with 
London and the South East having around 40% of all VC investments in the period 1997-2001. 
 
3
 In an assessment of the European Seed Capital Fund Scheme, Murray (1998) found that the opinions of managers of 
publicly-supported, regional VC funds diverged significantly from those of commercial VC funds in terms of minimum 
level of financial attractiveness of a business opportunity, as measured by the target Internal Rate of Return (IRR). 
9 
 
1999)
4
. Third, experienced venture capitalists with sophisticated investing skills and wide relational 
networks are more likely to be located in economically advanced regions, due to the spatial 
concentration of VC activity (Mason and Harrison, 2003). Following such arguments, in our 
empirical analyses we will try to determine the existence of differences of exit performance (both in 
terms of likelihood to reach an IPO/acquisition or, on the contrary, a write-off) between high-tech 
and low-tech regions, for what concerns publicly-supported VC funds vis a vis private ones. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
3.1 The empirical setting: government-supported VC funds in the United Kingdom 
 
We chose as empirical setting for our analyses the VC industry in the United Kingdom, since it is 
the largest and most developed in Europe and it is second to the USA in world importance. In 
addition to that, in the UK there is a long tradition and experience with government interventions in 
favour of equity investments in start-up companies (Nightingale et al., 2009), starting from the late 
1945 with the formation of the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC). However, 
the biggest changes started after the 1979 election, with an increased emphasis on small firms as 
sources of job creation and economic growth to be further exploited and the subsequent introduction 
of the Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) in 1980 and the Business Start up Scheme in 
1981 (then substituted by the Business Expansion Scheme in 1983) to address market failures.  
In the nineties, the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) and the Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) 
introduced tax incentives to encourage informal and private (i.e. non-institutional) investors to 
provide greater sums of seed, start up and early growth risk capital finance (Cowling et al., 2008). 
VCTs attracted mainly retail investors seeking exposure to a diverse portfolio of venture 
investments, while EIS appealed principally to informal investors (Boyns et al., 2003). A new and 
sizeable wave of public support occurred after the introduction of the Competitiveness White Paper 
in 1998, to support knowledge-based firms with high levels of intangible assets that had less 
collateral to achieve loans and, thus, were particularly suitable for equity financing. With this 
document, the UK government announced and later developed a broad range of hybrid VC funds 
designed to support small, innovative and growth-oriented companies. A £270 million Enterprise 
Fund and an Early Growth Fund were introduced to address market weaknesses and to favour 
                                                 
4
 The study of Lerner (1999) on the effects of the SBIR program in the US shows that the significantly superior growth 
of SBIR awardees with respect to matched companies was confined to awardees located in high-tech regions. It also 
highlights the ability of particular companies (so-called “SBIR mills”) to capture a disproportionate number of awards, 
thanks to their behavior as active lobbysts. 
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investments in start-up and early-stage businesses respectively. The creation of the UK High Tech 
Fund of Funds had the aim to support existing technology-based VC funds by gathering over £100 
million from new institutional investors and modify the wrong perception that investments in 
technology produce lower commercial returns. This intervention was complemented by the creation 
of University Challenge Funds (UCF), introduced to provide technological and commercial support 
to academic spin-offs, a particular group of small and innovative companies deriving from 
universities. In addition to that, nine Regional Venture Capital Funds (RVCFs) and other specialist 
VC funds were created to provide support for smaller-scale (below £500,000) equity investments in 
young, risky and high potential companies across England. Lastly, the Early Growth Funds (EGF) 
were based on the collaboration with the angel community to ensure that every UK region had 
access to early growth funding of up to £100,000 per recipient firm (Nightingale et al., 2009).  
In addition to such direct measures, other interventions were introduced to increase the quality of 
companies seeking equity financing. Some examples of these interventions were the six investment 
readiness demonstration projects launched in 2002 with the logic to work in coordination with 
Regional Development Agencies and create suitable programmes at a local level to increase the 
flow of valuable investment opportunities and launch, in a second stage, a national investment ready 
programme following the evaluation of the preliminary pilot projects. 
The effects of some of these government interventions in the market for equity have been 
econometrically evaluated in a recent report for the British Venture Capital Association and the 
National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts by Nightingale and colleagues (2009). 
The results suggest a positive impact on firm performance, when compared to a matched control 
sample. However, in terms of magnitude, the size of their impact is quite small.  
At the light of this broad pool of public interventions, the United Kingdom represents a suitable 
context to increase our understanding of this type of financing by focusing on their investments 
decisions and outcomes in the different regions. Furthermore, the skewed distribution of UK small 
and innovative companies among the UK regions allows us to assess if the impact of these publicly-
supported venturing programs varies between high-tech and low-tech regions. 
 
3.2. Sample and data sources 
 
In order to construct our sample we first identified all the companies funded by VC funds in the 
United Kingdom over the period 1998-2007 according to Venture Economics
5
.  We decided to start 
                                                 
5
 Coherently with the definition of venture capital adopted in this paper, we referred only to investments made in new or 
young companies, extracting data from Venture Economics related only to seed/start-up/early-stage rounds. 
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our data collection from 1998 since in that year the UK government published the Competitiveness 
White Paper establishing an ambitious program to support venture capital provision throughout the 
UK, that was implemented through the formation of several hybrid funds in partnership with the 
private sector, as described in the previous section.  
Following such criteria, we found 932 companies in Venture Economics. However, it was not 
possible to assign 34 of them to their respective regions, since information on company address was 
missing or incomplete. Therefore, our finale sample includes 898 companies backed by hybrid VC 
funds (243 companies) and private VC funds (655 companies) over the period 1998-2007 in the 
United Kingdom. However, since information on company age is restricted to 653 companies, our 
regression analyses are performed on this smaller sample. 
For each investee company, we collected the following information through Venture Economics: 
name, founding year, stage of development, location, country, main industry (according to the 
Venture Expert Industry Classification), number and date of all funding rounds, amount received in 
each investment round, VC funds involved in each investment round, status (active investment, 
IPO, merger or acquisition, write-off) as of end of December 2007. 
For each VC-fund identified in the previous step, we collected the following information: VC fund 
name, vintage year, managing VC firm, total amount raised, country of origin, investment stage 
focus, number of portfolio companies, type. We complemented information taken from Venture 
Expert on VC funds and portfolio companies by using other data sources, as described in more 
depth in the following section.  
Data on R&D and innovation intensity and outcomes for the different regions of the United 
Kingdom were obtained by the Regio database of Eurostat. 
 
3.3. Variables 
 
A listing of the variables used in the empirical analysis along with their definitions is provided in 
Table 1 below. It first specifies our dependent variables, divided into three major groups coherently 
with the approach of Cumming (2007), as described in Section 2.3: a) variables capturing the 
propensity to address the equity gap, by investing in early stage and high-tech companies; b) 
variables capturing the ability to attract additional venture capital, through staging and syndication; 
c) variables capturing the exit success of investee companies. Table 1 then presents the  explanatory 
and control variables adopted in the analyses. A more detailed explanation for the choice and 
construction of the two explanatory variables now follows. 
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----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Identifying hybrid funds: in order to fully capture the influence of publicly-supported VC funds in 
the various regions, it was necessary to identify the companies financed by at least one hybrid fund 
(that is, a fund backed by both private and public sector funding). To this purpose, we initially 
resorted on the classification provided by Venture Economics, which identifies different categories 
of VC firms: Private Equity,  Pension Funds, Financial Institutions, Corporations, Foundations and 
Endowments, Corporate, Venture Program, Service Providers, Individuals, and Other. The category 
“Venture Program” was of particular interest for our purposes, since it includes the following 
subcategories related to different forms of public sponsorship for VC investments: Government 
affiliated program; University affiliated program;  Business Development Fund; Incubators; Other 
Government programs. However, it was necessary to complete and extend this initial sample in 
order to have a more precise picture of companies backed by hybrid funds
6
. To do that, we tried to 
identify the names of all the hybrid VC funds activated in the UK over the period 1998-2007, by 
using the following data sources: the website of the UK Department for Trade and Industry; the 
OECD report on venture capital policy in the UK (OECD, 2003); the report of Nightingale et al. 
(2009) on hybrid funds in the UK; the articles by Mason and Harrison (2003)  and Sunley et al. 
(2005) on government VC policies in the United Kingdom. We then identified all the investee 
companies related to those funds for which information was available in Venture Economics
7
.  
We finally created a dummy variable Hybrid VC fund equal to 1 for all the companies backed by at 
least one hybrid VC fund, and 0 in all other cases (corresponding to companies exclusively backed 
by private VC funds). 
Assigning investee companies to high-tech and low-tech regions: In order to identify the regional 
distribution of venture capital activity, we assigned investee companies to the different regions of 
the United Kingdom, using the NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) system of 
Eurostat
8
. We related the location of each company (as reported in terms of mailing address and zip 
                                                 
6
 A major problem with the classification provided by Venture Economics stems from the fact that, in most of the cases, 
hybrid funds established in the UK are run by private VC general partnerships. Venture Economics tends often to 
classify such funds under the label “Private Equity” (and not “Venture Program”), even tough an important share of the 
money committed to the Fund comes from public sources. 
7
 We therefore identified all the companies included in the Venture Economics database (as of December 2007) backed 
by funds established with the 1998 Competitiveness White Paper: Enterprise Capital Funds, Early Growth Funds, 
Regional Venture Capital Funds, Community Development Funds. In addition to that, we covered other significant 
national or regional level initiatives (i.e. NESTA, Scottish Enterprise Funds, Welsh Hybrid Equity Funds, Invest 
Northern Ireland) and funds investing in socially benefiting sector thanks to public support (i.e. Low Carbon Seed Fund, 
Global Rights Funds). 
8
 The NUTS system is a geographic code standard for referencing the administrative divisions of countries of the 
European Union for statistical purposes. It encompasses three different levels (NUTS-1; NUTS-2; NUTS-3) and a 
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codes in Venture Economics) to UK regions identified at the NUTS-2 level. In order to separate 
high-technology regions from low-technology regions, we then collected information at the regional 
level from the Regio database of Eurostat on the following key variables of economic and 
technological development: GDP/capita; number of patent filings per million head; share of 
employment in high and medium high-tech manufacturing sectors. We used this latter category as a 
proxy of the degree of innovation intensity of the region. Indeed, the Eurostat regional yearbook 
(Edition 2009) classifies the different regions of Europe (at the NUTS-2 level) into 4 different 
classes: percentage of total employment in high and medium high-tech manufacturing sectors less 
than 5%; between 5% and 10%; between 10% and 15%; more than 15%. We therefore used the 
value of 10% as a cut-off point to separate high-tech regions (share of total employment more than 
10% in high and medium high-tech manufacturing) from low-tech regions (share of total 
employment less than 10% in high and medium high-tech manufacturing). We than created a 
dummy variable High-tech Region taking the value 1 for companies located in the former group of 
regions, and 0 for those located in the latter. Table A1, in the appendix, reports a list of the 36 
different regions in the UK, with the corresponding value of the dummy variable High-tech region.  
 
4. ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
4.1. Graphical presentation of the data 
 
A time series of all investments (in terms of number of investee companies) in the UK from 1998 to 
2007 is provided in Figure 1. As shown by the graph, the UK venture capital industry shares the 
wave-trend characterizing also other VC markets, like the US (Lerner, 2002a, 2002b), Canada 
(Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006), Europe (Armour and Cumming, 2006) and Australia (Cumming, 
2007). In all these cases, and in particular for the UK, VC investments showed a drastic increase in 
the years 1999 and 2000 leading up the beginning of the end of the bubble in April 2000. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Figures 2 and 3 presents the detail of VC investments in terms of type of fund and region 
respectively. It is evident the increasing importance of the public intervention, through the 
introduction of public funds, starting from the early 2000s (Figure 2) and the strong concentration 
                                                                                                                                                                  
further sub-classification into local administrative units. There are 12 NUTS-1 regions (North East, North West, 
Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland), 37 NUTS-2 regions and 133 NUTS-3 regions in the United Kingdom. 
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of equity investments in regions with high technological intensity (Figure 3). Interestingly, major 
differences in the numbers of companies backed by hybrid VC funds or private ones, or in the 
numbers of companies funded in high-tech or low-tech regions, seem to be concentrated in the years 
of the Internet Bubble, whereas they tend to shrink in the following years. This first evidence 
confirms that public programmes played an important role in supporting equity investments in 
newly established, high-tech companies, once the period of irrational exuberance related to the 
Internet bubble had expired.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 and 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
4.2. Descriptive and univariate statistics 
 
Table 2 summarizes the data from our sample of VC-backed companies that we use in our 
subsequent analyses. 27% of our companies are financed by hybrid funds, whereas 73% of them 
belong to regions with a share of employment in high-tech sectors greater than 10%. About 42% are 
companies in the seed/start-up phase. In terms of industry, 57% belong to high-tech sector (and 
more precisely, 20% from the biotech/medical/health sectors and 37% from ICT). On average, the 
companies included in our sample received 1.5 financing rounds by 1.85 different VC firms 
involved in syndicated partnerships. On average, 0.56 (around one third) of syndicated partners are 
investors located outside the UK, and only 0.122  are corporate investors. The average age of VC 
funds, which can be considered a proxy of the investors‟ experience, is 9 years. Only 16% of our 
sample companies received an IPO or have been acquired by other firms at the end of 2007, 
whereas less than 7% of them were defunct or filed for bankruptcy. The mean age of the company 
at date of the initial VC investment is around 7 years and the average duration of the VC 
involvement per company is 5 years at the end of 2007.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
A correlation matrix for the variables across the 898 investee companies is provided in Table 3. The 
statistics provide insights for possible problems of collinearity among the variables for different 
investee companies which is useful for correctly designing the econometric models used in the next 
section. Table 3 suggests that multi-collinearity problems among variables do not exist. 
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----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 provides univariate comparison tests for companies backed by hybrid versus private VC 
funds for the full sample (panel A) and for the split samples, by distinguishing between high-tech 
and low-tech regions (panel B and C). These tests, by examining differences in proportion and 
means for each of the dependent variables used in our model, indicate the trends in the data and 
provide preliminary insight into the degree to which the data support differences between hybrid 
and private funds by taking into account also regional differences.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Our univariate comparison tests in Table 4 – Panel A indicate the following results: 
1. Hybrid funds are more likely to finance companies in the seed/start-up phase than private 
investors, and these differences are significant at the 1% level of significance. 
2. Hybrid funds are more likely to finance companies operating in high-tech sectors than 
private investors, and these differences are significant at the 1% level of significance.  
3. There are not significant differences between hybrid and private funds in their staging 
strategies.  
4. Hybrid funds tend to syndicate more than private investors, and these differences are 
significant at the 1% level of significance. 
5. Hybrid funds are slightly less able to attract foreign investors than private funds (this 
difference is significant at the 10% level of significance), but are more able to attract 
corporate investors (this difference is significant at the 1% level of significance).  
6. Hybrid funds have a lower performance in terms of number of companies undergoing an 
IPO or an acquisition exit than private investors, and these differences are significant at the 
1% level of significance. 
7. Finally, there are not statistically significant differences in terms of failure rates between 
hybrid and private funds. 
 
Our additional comparison tests introducing the distinction between high-tech and low-tech regions 
are shown in Table 4 – Panel B and indicate the following evidence: 
1. Hybrid funds are more likely to finance seed stage companies than private investors, both in 
high-tech and low-tech regions with a slight difference in terms of  significance (5% level 
for high-tech regions and 1% level for low-tech regions). The percentage of investments 
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made by hybrid funds in the seed/startup phase is significantly larger in low-tech regions 
(62%) as compared to high-tech regions (49%), suggesting a stronger risk-propensity in the 
former context. 
2. Hybrid funds are more likely to finance companies operating in technology-based sectors 
than private investors both in high-tech and low-tech regions, but the difference in the two 
contexts is impressive both in terms of shares (respectively 62% vs. 79%) and statistical 
significance (5% level for high-tech regions and 1% level for low-tech regions). This 
suggests a strong orientation towards supporting the development of new technological 
capabilities and companies in low-tech regions. 
3. There are not statistically significant differences between hybrid and private funds in their 
staging strategies in both high-tech and low-tech regions, although the former present on 
average a higher number of financing rounds in the case of hybrid funds than the latter 
(respectively 1.59 vs. 1.40).  
4. Hybrid funds tend to syndicate with more partners than private investors only in high-tech 
regions, and this difference is significant at the 1% level of significance. This evidence 
signals a more limited ability of hybrid funds in low-tech regions to attract private VC firms 
in their investment choices. 
5. Hybrid funds seem to be less able than private VC funds to involve in syndicated deals 
foreign VC firms, in both high-tech and low-tech regions. However, in low-tech regions the 
percentage of foreign VC firms collaborating with hybrid funds reaches the lowest value 
(0.33). This suggests that the relational capabilities and attraction power of publicly-
sponsored VC funds in less developed areas represent a major challenge.  
6. Hybrid funds have a lower performance in terms of number of companies undergoing an 
IPO or an acquisition offer than private investors in both high-tech and low-tech regions, but 
this difference is more evident in high-tech regions (1% versus 10% level of significance for 
high-tech and low-tech regions respectively). Once again, the percentage of successful exits 
reaches the lowest value for hybrid funds in low-tech regions (7.7%), although it is not so 
different from their counterparts in high-tech regions (8.4%). 
7. Finally, there are not statistically significant differences in terms of failure rates between 
hybrid and private funds in both high-tech and low-tech regions. It is interesting to notice, 
however, that the percentage of write-offs for hybrid funds in low-tech regions is lower 
(5%) than in the case of private funds (10%), and it is also slightly lower than the values 
observed in high-tech regions for both hybrid and private VC funds (around 6%). In the light 
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of previous evidence, we can interpret such results as a signal of the higher propensity of 
hybrid VC funds in low-tech regions to maintain active investments. 
 
4.3. Regression analyses  
 
We analyze the different investment strategies and performance between hybrid and private funds 
under different regional environments in a regression framework, in order to control for the 
potential influence of other factors. For all the specifications of our model, we control for three 
different types of variables: (a) market conditions through the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) index in the year of investment and a dummy variable equal to one for the bubble years of 
1999 and 2000, (b) characteristics of the investee companies in terms of age and first VC 
investment year (as measured by investment duration at December 2007) and (c) fund 
characteristics in terms of average age of all the funds involved in syndication, to take into account 
the experience of the investors engaged in the financing process.  
In line with Cumming (2007) we define the following econometric models. For the regressions 
adopting Seed, High-tech Industry, IPO/Acquisition and Failure as dependent variables, we used a 
logit specification due to the binary nature of our variables. This model allows to assess the 
probability of the different types of fund to invest in seed companies, technology-based industries, 
obtain a positive exit (IPO or acquisition) and fail respectively. In the models related to staging, 
syndication, ability to attract foreign investors and corporate investors, instead, we used Poisson 
regressions. This model, indeed, is useful to deal with skewed distributed dependent count variables 
(Table 2, for instance, shows that the mean value of the variable staging is 1.5 so that the many 
investees have only one or two staged financing rounds, and a maximum value of 11 rounds 
suggesting that fewer investees are staged more frequently). 
We proceed into two steps. First, we perform our analyses on the full sample including all 650 
investee companies (due to missing value in the variable Company Age). Then, we analyze whether 
and how differences between hybrid and private funds change when we introduce the regional 
dimension. In order to do that, we split our observations into two sub-samples depending on the 
percentage of employment in high-tech sectors. Thus, we distinguish between a sample of 489 
observations for high-tech regions (High-tech Region =1) and a sample of 161 observations for low-
tech regions (High-tech Region =0).  
 
Stage of development and industrial focus 
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We first start discussing differences in the investment strategies of the funds, in terms of stage of 
development and industrial focus. Table 5 – Panel A presents the results for the Seed variable. 
Model 1 (which refers to the full sample) indicates that hybrid funds are 21.1% more likely to 
finance seed stage companies than private funds. When we split the sample between high-tech and 
low-tech regions (to assess the combined effect of the type of fund and regional characteristics) we 
find a significant difference in the investment decisions between hybrid and private funds especially 
in low-tech regions (marginal effects for the variable Hybrid VC Fund is 0.308 for low-tech regions 
and 0.184 for high-tech regions both at the 1% level of significance).  
Table 5 – Panel B shows the results for the industry focus. By distinguishing between technology-
based and non technology-based sectors
9
, we find that hybrid funds tend to invest more in high-tech 
sectors when compared to private funds (0.111 at the 5% level of significance). Interestingly, in the 
split sample analyses, this difference is confirmed only in low-tech regions. This confirms previous 
evidence from univariate analyses, highlighting a strong orientation of hybrid funds towards the 
renewal of the business environment in regions with apparently less opportunities of growth. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Staging and syndication 
As far as the ability of different types of funds to attract additional VC investments through a 
greater number of financing rounds or syndicated investors is concerned, the analyses on the full 
sample show the following evidence. There seems not to be any difference in terms of number of 
staging in the full sample, but the ability to involve other investors in syndication is greater for 
companies backed by hybrid VC funds than those backed by private VC funds. However, when we 
split the sample according to regional characteristics, we find that hybrid VC funds tend to have a 
greater performance in terms of staging when they operate in high-tech regions, but not when they 
operate in low-tech regions. Finally, when we analyze the type of investor in syndication, we find 
that hybrid and private VC funds do not present significant differences in their ability to attract 
investors that reside outside the UK (even if regional characteristics have an effect in favor of high-
tech regions). On the contrary, hybrid VC funds seem to be more able in attract corporations only 
when they operate in high-tech regions. 
                                                 
9
 As robustness check, we also analyzed differences in terms of industry at a more detailed level by distinguishing 
between health, ICT and non-technology industries. Our results confirm a greater propensity of public VC funds to 
invest in pharma and biotech industries, followed by ICT. Only a small proportion of public funds invest in non-
technology sectors. 
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----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Exit success of investee companies 
The last group of dependent variables intends to assess differences in the exit rate (in terms of 
IPO/acquisition or write-offs) between companies financed by hybrid versus private funds. Our 
results, shown in Table 7, suggest the absence of significant differences between the two types of 
funds both in the full and the split sample, once we control for company-, fund-, environmental-
characteristics. However, the analyses of failure rates of the investee companies show different 
results. In the full sample, again, hybrid and private funds present similar trends, but differences at 
the regional level matters with a greater probability to fail in low-tech regions (the marginal effect 
of the variable High-tech Region is equal to -0.0429 and significant at the 5% level). However, the 
split sample shows that the probability of failure is higher when the investee company belongs not 
only to a low-tech region but it is also financed by a private fund. When coupled with previous 
findings, which do not show a superior positive performance of companies backed by hybrid funds 
in low-tech regions (if not an inferior one), this evidence suggests a greater propensity of hybrid 
funds in less developed regions to maintain active their investments. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
As far as our control variables, under “good” market conditions (according with the MSCI index), 
the frequencies of stages and syndication decrease both in the full sample and in the split sample 
referred to high-tech regions, but this is not a significant factor in low-tech regions. Finally, as 
expected, it is negatively related to the frequency of failure of the investee companies (MSCI equal 
to -0.264 in low-tech regions at the 10% level of significance). Surprisingly, the environment 
conditions do not impact significantly on the successful exits (IPO plus acquisition) in all the 
models. The coefficient and significance level of the Bubble variable show that the propensity to 
invest in high-tech sectors, the number of financing rounds and the frequency of syndication 
decreased around the period 1999-2000 of the Internet bubble. The Company Age variable shows 
that younger firms tend to receive a greater number of financing rounds due to the higher levels of 
uncertainty in their business model and make the possibility of syndication more difficult. 
Accordingly, the Investment Duration variable increases for investments in seed companies and it 
has, as expected, a positive and statistically significant impact on the exit outcomes (the older the 
date of the first investment round by a VC, the more likely the possibility to reach an 
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IPO/acquisition or, on the contrary, a write-off). Finally, the average age of the funds investing in 
our sample companies is greater in seed investments in low-tech regions, decreases when the 
number of round increases and increases for higher frequencies of syndication and when the number 
of foreign funds in syndication is higher. These results suggest that the age of funds, as proxy for 
the experience of investors in equity financing, is an important explanatory factor. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this paper has been to assess the effectiveness of hybrid VC funds for the creation of 
active venture capital markets by taking into consideration also regional characteristics, as a 
consequence of the existence of significant “regional equity gaps” (Mason and Harrison, 2003). In 
particular, we were interested in investigating whether and how the impact of publicly-supported 
programs varies between high-tech and low-tech regions in the UK along three interrelated 
dimensions: the propensity to invest in early-stage and high-technology sectors, the capacity to 
attract qualified private VC investors and the ability to invest in and promote successful companies.  
Our results confirm that regional characteristics do matter if we want to more rigorously assess the 
effectiveness of public VC programmes, given that important differences emerge between high-tech 
and low-tech regions in the above mentioned dimensions. 
They also draw a mixed scenario as to the contribution of hybrid fund in closing the regional equity 
gaps. On the one hand, we highlighted a number of encouraging findings suggesting that the role of 
government in addressing the equity gap is critical and effective. Hybrid funds tend to finance more 
than private VC funds seed/start-up companies operating in technology-based sectors such as the 
ICT or the pharmaceutical industries. This attempt is particularly pronounced in low-tech regions, 
whereas it is weaker in more high-tech regions, consistently with the aim of complementing private 
VC funds in that areas, that tend to be more concentrated in such sectors. This finding is in line with 
the explicit objective formulated by public programmes to support the creation and growth of new 
and high potential firms for fostering innovation, research and development, entrepreneurship, 
economic growth and job creation. It should be stressed, however, that the strong orientation of 
hybrid VC funds towards high-tech sectors in economically lagging region (particularly pronounced 
in the case of biotech/medical/health investments, according to our data) might involve significant 
risks of backing underachieving companies. Finding a right balance between supporting local 
economic development in new technology-intensive sectors and limiting the risks of backing 
unworthy target companies appears to be a major challenge in such regions. Turning to performance 
measures based on staging, syndication, successful exit through IPO/acquisition or negative exit 
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through write-off, our results suggest that hybrid VC funds still tend to be more effective in high-
tech regions, whereas they experience more difficulties in low-tech ones.  
As one of the main goals of these funds is to foster economic growth in less promising geographical 
areas, it is important to further improve the impact of these programmes along two main directions: 
first, stimulate equity investments in these areas to improve the environment for new and growing 
young enterprises and, second, increase the quality and the number of growth oriented companies to 
attract further investors. These two directions are complementary to each other as they allow to 
address the equity gap from both the supply and the demand side by increasing the number of 
investors for growth-oriented companies and the number of valuable opportunities for investors. 
Perhaps, all too often regional social and economic disparities are addressed through public 
programmes that nominally have no geographic or social element and are designed to promote 
exclusively innovation or entrepreneurial behavior. Thus, more effort is needed to level off the 
disparity in the regional supply of private VC finance that is reflected also in the skewed 
distribution of entrepreneurial and innovation opportunities among regions. To make more precise, 
there is more VC finance in London and in the South East because there is more opportunity for 
attractive investment in these advanced regions. Thus, if the government is concerned to encourage 
enterpreneurship or innovation, hybrid VC funds need to have a greater impact also in low-tech 
regions to avoid the danger to support a process of cumulative causation and disparities in which 
some regions become centres of entrepreneurial finance while others have a much weaker 
engagement with risk capital. 
Finally, we would like to pointed out that even if this study do not directly measure the performance 
of hybrid funds in terms of quantitative criteria such as investment returns or economic outcomes, it 
provides policy makers with useful insight to better understand along which directions existing and 
future public interventions should move to fully address the equity gap. The ideal framework is to 
create programmes able to address the equity gap both from the demand and supply side, taking into 
consideration the regional specificities, in order to improve the quality of investment opportunities 
and create an environment in which equity financing is more easily available. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Fig. 1. This figure presents UK venture capital investments in the period 1998-2007. 
 
 
Fig. 2. This figure presents UK venture capital investments, by investor type, in the period 1998-2007. 
 
 
Fig. 3. This figure presents UK venture capital investments, by region, in the period 1998-2007. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions. 
 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Dependent variables capturing the propensity to address the equity gap 
Seed  A dummy variable equal to one for companies funded in the seed/startup phase 
according to the Venture Economics classification, and zero otherwise (for 
companies funded in the early-stage phase) 
Venture 
Economics  
High-tech 
Sector 
A dummy variable equal to one for companies operating in high-technology 
sectors according to the Venture Economics classification (biotech, 
medical/health, computer hw and sw, Internet related, semiconductors and 
communications), and zero otherwise  
Venture 
Economics 
Dependent variables capturing the ability to attract additional VC investments 
Staging The number of staged investment rounds in which VCs financed the company Venture 
Economics 
Syndication The number of  syndicated VC investors for all of the financing rounds Venture 
Economics 
Foreign 
Syndication 
The number of foreign (i.e not from the UK) syndicated VC investors for all of 
the financing rounds 
Venture 
Economics 
Corporate 
Syndication 
The number of corporate (i.e Corporate Venture Capital) syndicated VC investors 
for all of the financing rounds 
Venture 
Economics 
Dependent variables capturing the exit success of investee companies 
IPO/Acquisition A dummy variable equal to one if the investee has been exited through an IPO or 
an acquisition as of December 2007, according to the Venture Economics, and 
zero otherwise 
Venture 
Economics 
Failure A dummy variable equal to one for companies defunct or under bankruptcy 
regime as of December 2007,  according to the Venture Economics, and zero 
otherwise 
Venture 
Economics 
Explanatory variables 
Hybrid VC 
Fund 
A dummy variable equal to one for companies financed by hybrid funds (backed 
by both public and private sector money), and zero otherwise (companies backed 
only by private VC funds) 
Venture 
Economics and 
other sources 
(see Section 3.3) 
High-tech 
Region 
A dummy variable equal to one for companies located in an high-tech region (in 
which the share of employment in high-tech or medium-high tech manufacturing 
sectors is greater than 10% of total employment), and zero otherwise (companies 
located in low-tech regions) 
Eurostat 
(see Section 3.3) 
Control variables 
MSCI The Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI) equity return (UK) 
in the first round investment year. 
Worldscope 
Bubble A dummy variable equal to one for an exit in 1999 or 2000 (and zero otherwise) Venture 
Economics 
Company Age Number of years from the founding year to 2007 Venture 
Economics 
Investment 
Duration 
Number of years of investment (from the first round to the exit)  Venture 
Economics 
Age Funds The average age of all the funds in syndication that financed the investee 
company 
Venture 
Economics 
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Table 2. Summary statistics by investee companies. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Hybrid VC Fund 898 .2706013 .444518 0 1 
High-tech Region 898 .7383073 .4398011 0 1 
Seed 898 .4154535 .4930762 0 1 
High-tech Sector 898 .5679287 .4956402 0 1 
Staging 898 1.513363 1.173062 1 11 
Syndication 898 1.856347 1.624255 1 17 
Foreign Syndication 898 .5634744 1.063681 0 12 
Corporate Syndication 898 .1224944 .3929785 0 3 
IPO/Acquisition 898 .1648107 .3712164 0 1 
Failure 898 .0690423 .2536674 0 1 
Company Age 653 7.367534 4.169306 0 62 
Investment Duration 898 5.151448 2.561921 0 9 
Average Fund Age 898 9.100121 5.34401 0 39 
MSCI 898 .0040223 .1239194 -.257 .16 
Bubble 898 .3819599 .4861375 0 1 
This table summarizes the data of the full sample by the average, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values. The number of observations for each variable is also indicated.
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Staging 1               
(2) High-tech Region 0.0187 1              
(3) IPO/Acquisition 0.1025 0.0391 1             
(4) Failure -0.0368 -0.0377 -0.1210 1            
(5) Company Age 0.0919 -0.0178 0.1469 0.0378 1           
(6) Seed 0.0269 -0.0454 -0.0495 0.0290 -0.1582 1          
(7) High-tech Sector 0.1787 -0.0590 0.0239 -0.0728 -0.0177 0.0540 1         
(8) Hybrid VC Fund 0.0091 -0.0765 -0.1355 -0.0176 -0.2006 0.1506 0.1366 1        
(9) Syndication 0.5033 0.0300 0.1392 -0.0219 -0.0013 0.0368 0.1818 0.1141 1       
(10) Foreign VCs 0.2647 0.0892 0.1203 -0.0039 -0.0346 -0.0051 0.0901 -0.0588 0.6773 1      
(11) Corporate VCs 0.3157 0.0309 0.0525 0.0269 -0.0222 0.0075 0.0946 0.0589 0.3594 0.2241 1     
(12) Average fund age -0.0438 -0.0033 0.1152 0.0220 0.1380 0.0565 -0.0467 -0.1345 0.0725 0.1611 -0.0084 1    
(13) Investment duration 0.0917 0.0491 0.2844 0.1760 0.4859 0.0597 -0.0757 -0.2465 0.0639 0.0709 0.0070 0.2813 1   
(14) MSCI -0.0904 0.0382 -0.0285 -0.0677 -0.0357 -0.0654 0.0471 0.0662 -0.0716 -0.0286 -0.0333 0.0142 0.0732 1  
(15) Bubble -0.0373 0.1239 0.1759 0.2018 0.2676 0.0175 -0.1703 -0.1899 -0.0081 0.0727 -0.0409 0.1753 0.0258 -0.1177 1 
 
This table presents correlations across variables. Correlations statistically significant at the 5% level are highlighted in underline font.  
29 
 
Table 4. Comparison of proportions and means for type (hybrid and private) of funds (A) in the full sample, (B) in high-tech regions and (C) 
low-tech regions. 
 
 (A) Full Sample (B) High-tech Region (C) Low-tech Region 
 Hybrid (1) Private (0) (0)-(1) Hybrid (1) Private (0) (0)-(1) Hybrid (1) Private (0) (0)-(1) 
 
Obs. 
Proportion  
or Mean 
Obs. 
Proportion  
or Mean 
Difference Obs. 
Proportion  
or Mean 
Obs. 
Proportion  
or Mean 
Difference Obs. 
Proportion  
or Mean 
Obs. 
Proportion  
or Mean 
Difference 
Seed 243 .5371901 655 .3701997 -.1669904*** 166 .4969697 497 .3704453 -.1265244** 77 .6233766 158 .3694268 -.2539499*** 
High-tech Sector 243 .6790123 655 .5267176 -.1522948*** 166 .626506 497 .5251509 -.1013551** 77 .7922078 158 .5316456 -.2605622*** 
                
Staging 243 1.530864 655 1.50687 -.023994 166 1.590361 497 1.50503 -.0853313 77 1.402597 158 1.512658 .1100608 
Syndication 243 2.160494 655 1.743511 -.4169824*** 166 2.295181 497 1.748491 -.5466898*** 77 1.87013 158 1.727848 -.1422818 
Foreign Syndication 243 .4609053 655 .6015267 .1406214* 166 .5180723 497 .6539235 .1358513 77 .3376623 158 .4367089 .0990465 
Corporate Syndication 243 .1604938 655 .1083969 -.0520969* 166 .1626506 497 .1187123 -.0439383 77 .1558442 158 .0759494 -.0798948* 
                
IPO/Acquisition 243 .0823045 655 .1954198 .1131153*** 166 .0843373 497 .2032193 .118882*** 77 .0779221 158 .1708861 .092964* 
Failure 243 .0617284 655 .0717557 .0100273 166 .0662651 497 .0623742 -.0038908 77 .0519481 158 .1012658 .0493178 
This table presents comparison of proportions tests (for seed, high-tech, health, ICT, IPO or acquisition and failure), and means tests (for staging, syndication, foreign 
VCs and corporate VCs) for both hybrid and private funds. The first three columns refer to the full sample, columns from 4 to 6 refer to the high-tech region and the last 
three refer to the low-tech region. *, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Logit regression analyses of (A) stage of development and (B) type of industry. 
 
 (A) Seed (B) High-tech sector 
 
Full 
High-tech 
Region 
Low-tech 
Region 
Full 
High-tech 
Region 
Low-tech 
Region 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.211*** 
(0.0486) 
-.3556533 
(.317857) 
-1.656258** 
(.696869) 
.0482552 
(.3095363) 
.0787291 
(.3098948) 
-.2486458 
(.5603097) 
       
Fund characteristics       
Hybrid VC Fund 0.211*** 
(0.0486) 
0.184*** 
(0.0565) 
0.308*** 
(0.101) 
0.111** 
(0.0454) 
0.0891 
(0.0544) 
0.180** 
(0.0829) 
High-tech Region -0.0220 
(0.0474) 
  -0.00765 
(0.0459) 
  
       
Market conditions       
MSCI -0.150 
(0.170) 
-0.0644 
(0.195) 
-0.344 
(0.364) 
0.182 
(0.168) 
0.181 
(0.196) 
0.229 
(0.345) 
Bubble -0.0100 
(0.0518) 
-0.00979 
(0.0591) 
0.0287 
(0.113) 
-0.187*** 
(0.0522) 
-0.241*** 
(0.0592) 
0.0106 
(0.108) 
       
Investee characteristics        
Seed    0.0270 
(0.0414) 
0.00814 
(0.0481) 
0.0843 
(0.0841) 
Company Age -0.0759*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0640*** 
(0.0135) 
-0.118*** 
(0.0234) 
0.00184 
(0.00564) 
0.00830 
(0.00830) 
-0.00333 
(0.00799) 
Investment Duration 0.0864*** 
(0.0158) 
0.0684*** 
(0.0175) 
0.152*** 
(0.0342) 
0.0165 
(0.0125) 
0.0133 
(0.0152) 
0.0111 
(0.0253) 
       
Fund characteristics       
Average Fund Age 0.00621 
(0.00422) 
0.00341 
(0.00479) 
0.0208** 
(0.00952) 
0.00218 
(0.00424) 
0.00161 
(0.00486) 
0.00459 
(0.00888) 
       
Model diagnostics       
Model Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Loglikelihood -399.0088 -307.84071 85.181374 -427.49797 -319.55707 -103.41832 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0963 0.0704 0.2272 0.0271 0.0371 0.0362 
Chi-squared 85.05*** 46.66*** 50.08*** 23.81** 24.63*** 7.78 
N. obs.  650 489 161 650 489 161 
This table presents logit regressions of the probability of investees in seed stage and in different industries. Explanatory 
variables include the type of venture capital fund (hybrid and private) and the type of region (with high or low 
percentage of employment in high-tech sectors). Control variables include market conditions (MSCI market conditions 
in the year of investment and a dummy variable equal to one for the bubble years of 1999 and 2000), investee 
characteristics (age company and investment duration) and fund characteristics (average age of the funds in 
syndication). The numbers indicated are the marginal effects, and not the traditional logit coefficients as the marginal 
effects allow to illustrate the probability of the dependent variable being observed as a direct result of the explanatory 
variable. Two specifications are presented for each dependent variable: models 1, 4, 7 and 10 analyse the full sample 
while the others refer to the split sample between high-tech (models 2, 5, 8 and 11) and low-tech regions (models 3, 6, 9 
and 12). *, **, *** Significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 6. Poisson regression analyses of (A) staging, (B) syndication and (C-D) type of investor in syndication. 
 (A) Staging (B) Syndication (C) Foreign Syndication (D) Corporate Syndication 
 
Full 
High-tech 
Region 
Low-tech 
Region 
Full 
High-tech 
Region 
Low-tech 
Region 
Full 
High-tech 
Region 
Low-tech 
Region 
Full 
High-tech 
Region 
Low-tech 
Region 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant .293849** 
(.1221607) 
.2406652** 
(.1232945) 
.481708** 
(.2177822) 
.3229469** 
(.1098309) 
.3602791*** 
(.1105079) 
.4296433** 
(.1972109) 
-.9649951*** 
(.1980126) 
-.5508045** 
(.1812464) 
-1.096123** 
(.4140138) 
-2.207874*** 
(.4247952) 
-2.054993*** 
(.4002252) 
-.9539399 
(.8060111) 
             
Fund characteristics             
Hybrid VC Fund .1007166 
(.0734722) 
.1472752* 
(.0860678) 
.0133641 
(.1434957) 
.3147719*** 
(.0634201) 
.3612923*** 
(.0738497) 
.2112953* 
(.1252361) 
-.0413407 
(.1221073) 
-.0511143 
(.1383662) 
.0558826 
(.2643729) 
.5553164** 
(.2288674) 
.5759325** 
(.2601809) 
.4862875 
(.4921481) 
High-tech Region .0348748 
(.0728127) 
  .0691513 
(.0650707) 
  .3942723** 
(.1272672) 
  .3778537 
(.2663844) 
  
             
Market conditions             
MSCI -.4718964* 
(.2537538) 
-.5701659** 
(.2885784) 
-.235015 
(.5514462) 
-.5349861** 
(.2293062) 
-.6090593** 
(.260331) 
-.4939561 
(.504089) 
-.3845738 
(.4120569) 
-.4690922 
(.4496232) 
-.0546562 
(1.088749) 
-.595087 
(.8513974) 
-.3449585 
(.9234856) 
-3.114226 
(2.49045) 
Bubble -.2171464** 
(.0788915) 
-.2796679** 
(.0892258) 
.011382 
(.1706926) 
-.1409519** 
(.0711411) 
-.2403188** 
(.0802232) 
.1847692 
(.1545028) 
.0208 
(.1256335) 
-.1262868 
(.1364173) 
.7904291** 
(.3214773) 
-.5486667** 
(.2799622) 
-.674767** 
(.2970379) 
.477767 
(.8068216) 
             
Investee characteristics              
Seed .0341246 
(.0652403) 
.0401671 
(.0753309) 
.0752883 
(.1370518) 
.0095539 
(.0583534) 
-.0301036 
(.0670125) 
.1458581 
(.1220275) 
-.1046244 
(.1033908) 
-.1943338* 
(.1147826) 
.1584313 
(.2587704) 
-.1344741 
(.2237233) 
-.2350525 
(.2520119) 
.3669385 
(.5420956) 
Company Age .0152937** 
(.0072777) 
.0324748** 
(.0104811) 
-.0042866 
(.0143392) 
-.0007203 
(.0085372) 
-.0017895 
(.011369) 
.0006609 
(.0126412) 
-.0567865** 
(.0219379) 
-.0455145** 
(.0227345) 
-.1525971** 
(.0726479) 
-.0015408 
(.0325479) 
.0150569 
(.0375509) 
-.0367632 
(.1045295) 
Investment Duration .0464206** 
(.0186265) 
.0404387* 
(.0219161) 
.0305641 
(.0419307) 
.0335788** 
(.017291) 
.0467686** 
(.0200652) 
-.0131566 
(.0372464) 
.0475035 
(.0337104) 
.0510608 
(.0354966) 
.054314 
(.1021646) 
.0549611 
(.0645607) 
.0879445 
(.0696138) 
-.2501749 
(.2011813) 
             
Fund characteristics             
Average Fund Age -.0184536** 
(.0075616) 
-.0184342** 
(.0088707) 
-.0198163 
(.0152105) 
.0121536** 
(.0057108) 
.0132276** 
(.0065509) 
.011904 
(.0123178) 
.0421902*** 
(.0080916) 
.0406196*** 
(.0089725) 
.0673834** 
(.0225918) 
-.0287997 
(.0274507) 
-.0284818 
(.0317494) 
-.0439239 
(.0625739) 
             
Model diagnostics             
Model Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson 
Loglikelihood -954.16966 -716.35295 -233.30579 -1122.7658 -840.99825 -277.11337 -757.00065 -599.40919 -149.69012 -276.95971 -217.03514 -56.073398 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0154 0.0237 0.0084 0.0173 0.0228 0.0168 0.0289 0.0214 0.0754 0.0268 0.0279 0.0750 
Chi-squared 29.77*** 34.77*** 3.97 39.61*** 39.32*** 9.48 45.08*** 26.16*** 24.42*** 15.26* 12.47* 9.09 
N. obs.  650 489 161 650 489 161 650 489 161 650 489 161 
This table presents poisson regressions of the probability of staging, syndication and type of investors in syndication. Explanatory variables include the type of venture capital 
fund (hybrid and private) and the type of region (with high or low percentage of employment in high-tech sectors). Control variables include market conditions (MSCI market 
conditions in the year of investment and a dummy variable equal to one for the bubble years of 1999 and 2000), investee characteristics (age company and investment duration) 
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and fund characteristics (average age of the funds in syndication). Two specifications are presented for each dependent variable: models 1, 4, 7 and 10 analyse the full sample 
while the others refer to the split sample between high-tech (models 2, 5, 8 and 11) and low-tech regions (models 3, 6, 9 and 12). *, **, *** Significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 7. Logit regression analyses of (A) positive exit and (B) failure. 
 
 (A) IPO/Acquisition (B) Failure 
 
Full 
High-tech 
Region 
Low-tech 
Region 
Full 
High-tech 
Region 
Low-tech 
Region 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -3.973427*** 
(.5563297) 
-4.505888*** 
(.7127309) 
-3.189356*** 
(.8297059) 
-3.218948*** 
(.8958155) 
-4.746468*** 
(1.214952) 
-2.255338* 
(1.352413) 
       
Fund characteristics       
Hybrid VC Fund -0.0384 
(0.0327) 
-0.0346 
(0.0367) 
-0.0415 
(0.0655) 
0.00177 
(0.0171) 
0.0266 
(0.0211) 
-0.0760** 
(0.0349) 
High-tech Region -0.00366 
(0.0314) 
  -0.0429** 
(0.0211) 
  
       
Market conditions       
MSCI -0.0753 
(0.111) 
-0.160 
(0.122) 
0.135 
(0.243) 
-0.0471 
(0.0595) 
0.01000 
(0.0590) 
-0.264* 
(0.152) 
Bubble -0.0276 
(0.0288) 
-0.0252 
(0.0309) 
-0.0357 
(0.0646) 
0.0454* 
(0.0232) 
0.0392* 
(0.0231) 
0.0754 
(0.0683) 
       
Investee characteristics        
Seed -0.0399 
(0.0269) 
-0.0415 
(0.0288) 
-0.0183 
(0.0617) 
-0.0235* 
(0.0134) 
-0.0215* 
(0.0128) 
-0.0119 
(0.0317) 
Company Age -0.000691 
(0.00442) 
-4.89e-05 
(0.00483) 
-0.00286 
(0.00950) 
-0.00397 
(0.00323) 
-0.00309 
(0.00309) 
-0.00215 
(0.00700) 
Investment Duration 0.0559*** 
(0.00878) 
0.0602*** 
(0.00964) 
0.0463** 
(0.0195) 
0.0131** 
(0.00545) 
0.0124** 
(0.00504) 
0.00194 
(0.0149) 
       
Fund characteristics       
Average Fund Age 0.00186 
(0.00280) 
0.00161 
(0.00295) 
0.00157 
(0.00653) 
-0.00231 
(0.00184) 
-0.00227 
(0.00183) 
-0.00131 
(0.00412) 
       
Model diagnostics       
Model Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Loglikelihood -281.66284 -209.72975 -70.486112 -136.35873 -88.758696 -42.773913 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1148 0.1340 0.0716 0.1086 0.1263 0.1424 
Chi-squared 73.09*** 64.90*** 10.88 33.24*** 25.66*** 14.21** 
N. obs.  650 489 161 650 489 161 
This table presents logit regressions of positive exit (IPO or acquisition) and failure (bankruptcy and divestiture). 
Explanatory variables include the type of venture capital fund (hybrid and private) and the type of region (with high or 
low percentage of employment in high-tech sectors). Control variables include market conditions (MSCI market 
conditions in the year of investment and a dummy variable equal to one for the bubble years of 1999 and 2000), 
investee characteristics (age company and investment duration) and fund characteristics (average age of the funds in 
syndication). The numbers indicated are the marginal effects, and not the traditional logit coefficients as the marginal 
effects allow to illustrate the probability of the dependent variable being observed as a direct result of the explanatory 
variable. Two specifications are presented for each dependent variable: models 1 and 4 analyse the full sample while the 
others refer to the split sample between high-tech (models 2 and 5) and low-tech regions (models 3 and 6). *, **, *** 
Significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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8. APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Venture capital investments by UK region. 
 
Region High-tech Total Private Hybrid 
Outer London 1 172 143 29 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 1 96 78 18 
Inner London 1 90 76 14 
East Anglia 1 78 48 30 
Surrey, East and West 0 51 42 9 
Eastern Scotland 0 46 33 13 
Gloucestershire, Wilt 1 46 34 12 
South Western Scotland 0 33 20 13 
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 1 27 18 9 
Greater Manchester 1 26 17 9 
South Yorkshire 0 21 10 11 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 1 20 16 4 
East Wales 0 17 8 9 
West Midlands 1 17 3 14 
Northern Ireland 0 13 10 3 
Essex 0 12 10 2 
North Yorkshire 0 12 6 6 
West Yorkshire 0 12 5 7 
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 1 11 5 6 
West Wales and The Valleys 1 11 6 5 
Cheshire 1 9 7 2 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 1 9 7 2 
Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 1 9 5 4 
North Eastern Scotland 0 9 6 3 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire and 
Warwickshire 
1 8 7 1 
Shropshire and Staffordshire 1 8 8 0 
Merseyside 1 7 7 0 
Tees Valley and Durham 1 7 3 4 
Kent 0 5 5 0 
Lincolnshire 1 4 2 2 
Dorset and Somerset 1 3 2 1 
East Riding and North 1 3 3 0 
Lancashire 0 3 3 0 
Cornwall and Isles of 0 1 0 1 
Devon 1 1 1 0 
Highlands and Islands 0 1 1 0 
Total  898 655 243 
 
This table shows the distribution of venture capital investments (total, private and hybrid) by the 36 UK regions. The 
type of region (with high or low percentage of employment in high-tech or medium-high tech manufacturing industries) 
is also indicated. 
 
